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Abstract 
 
In this paper, we propose to transform the traditional cornea transplantation methods into an electronic exchange between the 
cornea donors and recipients in the cornea transplantation elective surgery. Preferential evaluations of recipient and donors 
(individuals / eye-bank) satisfactions are mathematically modeled, then the preference matrix is used as input for Gale 
Shapely matching algorithm. The results of m*n match happens to be a very transparent approach in a bilateral e-cornea 
transplantation environment. These matched results are compared with the results obtained using Generalized Assignment 
problem which produces NP-hard approximated matches. It is found that the proposed method produces stable matching, 
which is preference based and strategy proof and it also reduces the need for number of iterations for matching. 
 
© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The Indian government and private organizations had established a large number of eye-banks for cornea 
transplantation surgery. It is estimated that there are around 160 such registered eye-banks [1] in India. Managing 
availability of all corneas that are eligible for cornea transplantation donated in the regulated areas has to happen 
under the proposed matching framework. Donating/receiving outside is not permitted. Under this system, the 
cornea donors or eye-bank can place the availability of the medically examined corneas for transplantation with 
the details such as location, lead-time, age, units and type of cornea transplantation and they are matched to 
recipients in need, who are registered with this matching system. 
 
Matching DSS is created with the intention of providing cornea donors and recipients a centralized hub to 
donate the cornea of theirs’ or their deceased relatives, and to ensure that after medical examination, they will be 
allotted to recipients who are in need. But over the years, this system has been monopolized by eye-bank who 
offers the organ or they will call for donors. Moreover, the medical examination should be performed over the 
cornea donated by cornea donors to validate whether the organ is eligible for the match and the cornea recipients 
have to wait for their turn of the allocation process  (for several days / hours during the emergency / elective 
surgery). Burt [2] coined the term ’structural hole’ to denote the separation and discrepancy that exists when two 
groups of people have no direct contact with each other. In this match network, on one side there is a group of 
cornea donors and on the other side, there are recipients who are in need. These two groups are not allowed to 
offer/receive directly with each other and are forced to transact via the matching network. Therefore there is a 
structural hole in the network.  
© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license 
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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    Matching DSS is created with the intention of providing cornea donors and recipients a centralized hub to 
donate the cornea of theirs’ or their deceased relatives, and to ensure that after medical examination, they will be 
allotted to recipients who are in need. But over the years, this system has been monopolized by eye-bank who 
offers the organ or they will call for donors. Moreover, the medical examination should be performed over the 
cornea donated by cornea donors to validate whether the organ is eligible for the match and the cornea recipients 
have to wait for their turn of the allocation process (for several days / hours during the emergency / elective 
surgery). Burt [2] coined the term ’structural hole’ to denote the separation and discrepancy that exists when two 
groups of people have no direct contact with each other. In this match network, on one side there is a group of 
cornea donors and on the other side, there are recipients who are in need. These two groups are not allowed to 
offer/receive directly with each other and are forced to transact via the matching network. Therefore there is a 
structural hole in the network.  
 
     Table 1 given in Appendix illustrates the survey of Indian eye-bank for facilitating e-cornea transplantation 
elective surgery as listed below. There are no automatic mechanisms being implemented so far as proposed in this 
paper to match recipient and individuals / eye-bank (donor) with recipient fair play.  A match-making web based 
system has been developed to match multiple cornea donors and multiple recipients in a typical cornea 
transplantation scenario. A MILP model has been created to match cornea donors and recipients in a match 
framework in [2], but, it is a typical implementation of generalized assignment, where allocation takes place in 
multiple rounds. It is solely based on availability. It is taken into account, the typical satisfaction (in terms of 
Donor age, lead-time, location etc.) of recipient/individuals / eye-bank (donor) into account while cornea 
transplantation in an M*N match-making environment, which is considered in our work. A mathematical model 
has been developed to assess preferential scores of two distinct players, which is given as input to the Gale 
Shapely match algorithm in Section 2. The results are discussed in Section 6. Finally, the conclusion is presented 
in Section 7. 
 
2. Mechanism design for matching 
     We assume a set of recipients i = {1,2…,m} and set of cornea donors j = {1,2,…n}. Both cornea 
transplantation partners submit the attributes for their product to our web based decision support system (e-DSS) 
to find an optimal match. For a given organ of given quality level (based on age and result of medical 
examination) and promised lead time, the individuals / eye-bank (donor) must submit his true availability to the e-
DSS as a private information, along with the parameters such as age, medical history, location and lead time. The 
recipients will not know the valuation of contending donors. Similarly, the hospital staff on behalf of cornea 
recipients will submit the requirement for their organ transplantation surgery of a quality grade (based on age) in 
a closed form, along with their promised lead time of acceptance. The satisfaction level of recipient and 
individuals / eye-bank (donor) is determined as follows: 
 
2.1. Predicting quality of donor and recipient risk factors  
Most cornea transplant surgeries are successful. But cornea transplant surgeries always have a small risk of 
complications, such as rejection of the donor cornea. [5] Based on several studies graft failure in earlier stages 
was the most significant risk factor that lead to secondary failure (P = .0013). The risk of failure was 
significantly decreased with increase in postoperative time. Patient risk factors for secondary failures in earlier 
grafts probabilities were significantly in the form of; 
 
• race (P = .01),  
• age (P = .004),  
• iris color (P = .02),  
• preoperative glaucoma medications usage 
 (P = .0008),  
• deep stromal vascularization (P = .002), and  
• host horizontal diameter (P = 0.007).  
Significant risk factors for failures that are associated with immunologic allograft reactions in initial grafts 
included factors such as donor size (P = .05), horizontal corneal diameter (P = .002), as the differences between 
horizontal corneal diameter, and both donor size (P = .02) and recipient trephination size (P = .01).  However, 
deep stromal vascularization was only marginally significant (P = .09). Preoperative glaucoma medication usage 
in patient’s history was not a significant risk factor. The relationship of the recipient's horizontal corneal 
diameter to immunologic graft rejection is a new risk factor that surgeons can directly control and thereby help 
avoid graft failure. To achieve this, the quality parameter for donor is computed using the parameters mentioned 
above in the scale of 1 to 5. 
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2.2. Evaluation of Recipient Satisfaction Bij 
 
rij={σ ൌͳ ia* rija , 0}, rija€ (0,1);                                                    (1) 
 
where rija is fitness function for recipient “i” over donor j for attribute a. wia is weight given by recipient “i” for 
attribute “a”. The attributes considered by the recipient are age, location, quality value based on medical 
examination and lead time to offer. This demands true valuation of a product in terms of quality, lead time from 
the recipient and individuals / eye-bank (donor) respectively. This is modeled as follows: 
 
More is better: (quality) 
rija = ൞
ͳǡ ୨ୟ ൒ ୧ୟ
ୟౠ౗ିୣ୴౟౗ౣ౟౤
ୣ౟౗ିୣ୴౟౗ౣ౟౤
ǡ ୧ୟ୫୧୬ ൑ ୨ୟ ൏ ୧ୟ
Ͳǡ ୧ୟ ൏ ୧ୟ୫୧୬
                                              (2) 
Less is better:(lead-time) 
bija =൞
ͳǡ ୨ୟ ൑ ୧ୟ
ୣ୴౟౗ౣ౗౮ିୟౠ౗
ୣ୴౟౗ౣ౗౮ିୣ౟౗
୧ୟ ൏ ୨ୟ ൑ ୧ୟ୫ୟ୶
Ͳǡ ୨ୟ ൐ ୧ୟ୫ୟ୶
                                               (3) 
 
Where ୨ୟ= actual value of attribute “a” given by individuals / eye-bank (donor) “j”, ୧ୟ= expected value of 
recipient “i” for attribute “a”, ୧ୟ୫୧୬= Min expected value of recipient “i” for attribute “a”, ୧ୟ୫ୟ୶= Max 
expected value of recipient “i” for attribute “a”. 
 
2.3. Evaluation of Donor Satisfaction Sji 
 
Donor satisfies only on the allotment of recipient. 
Dji = ൞
ͳǡ ୠ୧ ൐ ୱ୨
୐ీ౟ି୐ీౠ
୐ీౠି୐ీౠౣ౟౤
Ͳǡ ୖ୧ ൏ ୈ୨୫୧୬
ǡ ୈ୨୫୧୬ ൑ ୈ୧ ൏ ୈ୨                                      (4) 
 
Where LRi = actual match of recipient “i”,  LDj = expected match of individuals / eye-bank (donor) “j”,            
LDjmin = Min expected match of individuals / eye-bank (donor) “j”. The calculated preferences Rij and Dji are used 
for preferential match using Gale Shapely algorithm. The GS algorithm calculates the number of matches over the 
registered donors and recipients using equation (5). 
 
No. of matches =σ ୧୨୫ǡ୬୧ǡ୨                                                 (5) 
 
Where, ୧୨ = number of corneas for transplantation between matched individuals / eye-bank (donor) i and 
recipients j. 
 
 The following constraints are used in the mechanism design. 
 
σ ୧ ൑୫୧ ୧                                            (6) 
 
The total number of units fetched from an individual / eye-bank (donor) is less than or equal to its demand.  
 
σ ୨ ൑୬୧ ୨                                           (7) 
 
The total number of units allocated to recipients is less than or equal to its available units.  
 
σ ୧ ൑୫୧ σ ୨୬୨                                          (8) 
 
The number of units allocated does not exceed the number of units available. 
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When a recipient is interested in a quality୧, it is okay if he is allocated a quality better than୧. However 
quality ୧ is determined using age, result of medical examination. When a donor has an organ of quality୨, it is 
okay if his allocation is for a quality lower than ୨ if he is getting the  match at nearby location or lesser lead-
time.                                                 (9) 
 
When a recipient intends to receive organ in a lead time of ୧, it is okay if he receives it in a lead time lower 
than ୧.                                                     (10) 
 
3. Match using Gale Shapely algorithm 
 
Shapley’s theory is based on marriage matching problem. In 1962 paper, Gale and Shapley explained this idea 
using the stable marriage problem [3]. In SMP it is asked how a number of women could be matched to a number 
of men, considering their respective preference value for each member of the opposite gender. They showed that 
regardless of the preferences, there would always exist a stable allocation. A stable allocation is one whereby no 
members can be better off by further exchange. Stability is property as it is viewed as an indication for efficiency 
because further improvement of satisfaction from exchange is not possible. In our application of match cornea 
donors and recipients, the recipients were chosen as the proposing member. 
In this paper, we assume that cornea donors and hospital staff who puts requirements for recipients are rational 
individuals who participate to cooperatively choose an allocation. Under our customized GS algorithm, upon 
registration by recipient/individuals (donor) / eye-bank (donor), they receive the best possible organ that is 
available for allotment respectively based on their reported preference order. Hereafter, recipient/individuals 
(donor) / eye-bank (donor) allocation can never deteriorate. Furthermore, if in the future the allocation can be 
improved due to either party’s cancellation. It follows that for every donor and recipient truthfully reporting its 
preference order is a dominant strategy. Hence, our customized GS algorithm is preference strategy-proof. 
 
4.  Matching constraints 
 
i. Each recipient/donor must register their organ. Else they cannot post a match. 
ii. A recipient/donor cannot offer/demand organ other than their registered organ. If a recipient/donor is 
registered in “Recipient-Donor” mode, then he can offer or receive organs as well. 
iii. A normal recipient can submit requirement to get any of the available organ. 
iv. If quantity exceeds threshold units of demand/supply (Threshold unit can be fixed by government 
personnel for normal organ exchange between recipient and donors in admin login console form) Eg: if 
it is 250 units per day, if recipient demands for 500 units he should give explanation before submitting a 
match. 
v. Options are provided to source from multiple donors. 
 
5. Delivery/Acceptance acknowledgement 
 
Once organs are offered by individuals / eye-bank (donor), donors must acknowledge for their offerings. 
Similarly, once delivered organs are received by recipient, they must acknowledge for receiving the organs and 
should submit feedback forms which have fields to tell about donor, about late shipments, deteriorated quality of 
promised entities, report of wrong quantity and for loss incidents. Based on the feedback we will rate both the 
recipient as well as donors. 
 
5.1. Additional Measures 
We routinely audit our signups using programmed internal mechanisms, matching rosters for strings of email 
addresses that come from the same private domain. We also look for similar names, usernames, and "local-parts" 
of email addresses across domains using internal mechanism. We also show matching result updates instantly, we 
collect loyalty feedback from both sides. That way, if someone is trying to cheat, based on feedback questionnaire 
we evaluate the users, and unless they went big, they won't know for sure if their method was successful. We try 
to be as much of a "black box" as possible since match works internally. 
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6. Experimental results 
 
Assume a sample input as given in Table 2. There are 5 Recipients and 7 Donors. Assume for all above 
records the organ type as “EYE”, organ name as “Cornea” and city as “CHENNAI”. Take a count of distinct 
CITY based on organ name. For above inputs the count will be 1 since all are of same type.  
 
 
Table 2: Input table 
 
 
USR_ID 
 
NO. OF 
EYES 
MIN_LEAD_TIME 
(Mins) 
MAX_LEAD_TIME 
(Mins) QUALITY MATCH_TYPE 
MATCH 
PRIORITY 
BS31  1 50 75 3 RECIPIENT 200 
BS32  2 65 75 1 RECIPIENT 350 
BS33  1 60 80 1 RECIPIENT 235 
BS34  1 55 65 1 RECIPIENT 340 
BS35 1 60 80 1 RECIPIENT 100 
BS36 1 60 80 1 DONOR 150 
BS37  2 50 80 2 DONOR 200 
BS38  1 65 90 2 DONOR 150 
BS39  1 55 80 1 DONOR 300 
BS40  1 65 90 2 DONOR 200 
BS41 1 62 78 1 DONOR 100 
BS42 1 61 82 1 DONOR 120 
 
The numbers of allocations are calculated iteratively over several rounds until there are either no recipients / 
donors for cornea transplantation. 
 
6.1. Comparison with Generalized assignment problem 
 
The proposed algorithm was compared with the mathematical formulation given by [2] for an Generalized 
assignment mechanism for implementing recipient/donor match in an e-match implementation. Constraints (6) 
to (10) presented in section 2 are checked for validity. Table 2 is given as input and the results are given in 
Tables 3 through 7 for various rounds of implementation. After completion of a round, donors and recipients 
who have been allocated the items are removed from the system. For the next round, the donors are given an 
opportunity to change their offering based on the demand observed in the first round. Similarly, the recipients 
are given an opportunity to increase their requirement, and the next round proceeds. This process continues as 
long as recipients are present in the system or until all requirements are matched. Total number of donors 
stagnated at the end of round 5 is 4. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Fnal Allocation results 
The comparison results of the proposed modified GS algorithm with preferential inputs were compared with 
classical Generalized-assignment model proposed by [2] and tabulated in Table 2. It is thus inferred that the 
proposed model is better in terms of reducing the number of rounds of allocation at the end of all rounds and 
minimizing the stagnation of donors /recipients at the end of allocation. The results produced by generalized 
assignment are always approximated to NP-hard and hence the allocation seems to be higher side, but it is a 
variable and depends on the random match variation by the donors. Whereas, the minimum guaranteed profit 
Comparison 
General 
assignment 
model 
Proposed GS Model 
No of rounds of allocation 5 2 
Net allocation (Avg) 300 312 
Performance 
Metrics 
Time Averaged for 
allocation 60ms 71ms 
Recipient/Donor 
stagnation 
3 D 
3 R 
4 D 
0 R 
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can be arrived in the proposed model. Also, the performance metric is chosen as “Time averaged allocation 
(TAA)”. With the assumption that every round of allocation (R) is done at the end of every time period ‘t’, TAP 
= Net allocation/R. When large number of multiple users updates matches in every round of allocation, system 
will face insert, update anomalies, whereas our proposed system will don’t have any such issues. 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
When there is no match exists (D, R) it is said to be a stable match by which both D and R are individually 
better than they would be with the element to which pairs are matched at present. This is achieved in this 
bilateral cornea transplantation scenario of matching recipients and donors with individual preferences. If the 
participating agents, recipients / sellers are rational and submit their true valuation of a multi-unit, single 
indivisible product to the decision support system (DSS), it is more likely that they get stable matches of 
allocation. The proposed method allows these registered persons to submit their availability/requirements in the 
form of [units, location, lead time] instead of the traditional Generalized assignment model of submitting 
matches in the form of [fixed individuals / eye-bank (donor)] in first round, which is then varied every round by 
the user to find an optimal match. Since, the offers/requirements are submitted as a private information to the 
DSS, it is more likely to make the allocation cheat-proof and produces matches in less number of rounds. 
Finding the best match solely depends on the true valuation of organs by the user. Also, the customized Gale 
Shapely algorithm has been applied to produce optimal matches in a bilateral cornea transplantation scenario, 
which is first of its kind application in an e-cornea transplantation environment. Compared to many e-elective 
surgery portals, the proposed model seems to be more realistic and transparent to the users in match donors and 
recipients. This DSS is first of its kind implementation for the e-cornea transplantation elective surgery.  
 
We further would like to make our e-portal to take the complete governance responsibility and act as the key 
interface in selecting partners, setup and evaluate performance metrics of the players, maintain accountability of 
material and services, provide feedback on operational status for the prospective development of its players.  
 
In this work, we have taken only the boundary values of the submitted offers/requirements to finalize the 
match. In our future work, we aim to build in Genetic algorithm to vary the offers/requirements from the 
submitted parameter ranges of the donor/recipient respectively to maximize the allocation. 
 
Appendix 
 
Website Drawbacks 
http://ebai.org/ Only users can register. No matching mechanisms are available 
eyebank.lvpei.org No matching mechanisms for donor and recipient are available. 
http://donateeyes.org/ Only donors can register themselves. There is no background 
mechanism for cornea allocation. 
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